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ABSTRACT: This paper provides a realist analysis of the EU’s legitimacy. 
We propose a modification of Bernard Williams’ theory of legitimacy, 
which we term critical responsiveness. For Williams, ‘Basic Legitimation 
Demand + Modernity = Liberalism’. Drawing on that model, we make 
three claims. (i) The right side of the equation is insufficiently sensitive to 
popular sovereignty; (ii) The left side of the equation is best thought of as 
a ‘legitimation story’: a non-moralised normative account of how to shore 
up belief in legitimacy while steering clear of both raw domination and 
ideological distortions. (iii) The EU’s current legitimation story draws on 
a tradition of popular sovereignty that sits badly with the supranational 
delegation and pooling of sovereign powers. We conclude by suggesting 
that the EU’s legitimation deficit may be best addressed demoicratically, 
by recovering the value of popular sovereignty at the expense of a degree 
of state sovereignty.  
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0. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) finds itself in times of crisis once more. The 
Euro-crisis, as well as the refugee crisis, has hit home1 hard, especially if 
one’s home is called Greece.  These events have triggered reflections on 
the question of social justice in the EU-polity.2 In parallel, the so-called 
democratic deficit has re-emerged on the agenda with a vengeance.3 A rise 
in anti-EU sentiments, exemplified by the Brexit referendum, relates the 
current stability of European integration to its perceived lack of 
democratic legitimacy. In academia, the democratic deficit has been a 
debate on the appropriate principles of democracy for Europe’s novel 
governance regime. An influential analysis is that the regime’s powers 
impact on national polities makes broadly consequentialist output and/or 
indirect intergovernmental legitimacy insufficient sources for the EU-
                                                
1 Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, 'When Europe Hits Home: Europeanization 
and Domestic Change', (2000) 4(15) European Integration Online Papers 
(EIoP). 
2 E.g. Phillippe Van Parijs, ‘Should the European Union become more 
Democratic?’ Just Democracy: The Rawls-Machiavelli Programme (ECPR Press, 
2011) 67-78; Rainer Forst, 'Justice and democracy. Comment on Jürgen Neyer' 
in Rainer Forst and Rainer Schmalz-Bruns (eds), Political Legitimacy and Democracy 
in Transnational Perspective (ARENA, 2011) 37-42. 
3 eg Richard Bellamy and Uta Staiger, UCL European Institute, The Eurozone 
Crisis and the Democratic Deficit (2013), online: <www.ucl.ac.uk/european-
institute/analysis-publications/publications/eurozone-crisis>. 
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regime. Rather than reflecting on the possible sources of legitimacy in the 
traditional input/output paradigm, we want to propose to understand the 
democratic deficit as a result of the regime’s inability to reflect the 
democratic citizens’ commitment to popular sovereignty. 
In this paper, we thus propose a different account of the EU’s 
legitimacy deficit—one that breaks with both the voluntaristic and the 
consequentialists standard accounts, and that is specific to the EU’s 
supranational governance structures. Our approach draws on and amends 
the realist theory of legitimacy recently developed by Bernard Williams 
and others. Our starting point is the idea that legitimacy depends not on 
responsiveness to citizens’ will, but to citizens’ values. But responsiveness is 
not simply a matter of reflecting actual values (ie beliefs and 
commitments). Those need to be corrected for ideological distortions. So we 
term our approach critical responsiveness. More specifically, rulers rely on 
legitimation stories to accompany the exercise of their coercive power, and 
those legitimation stories need to be in line with the citizenry’s values, but 
they also need to be accepted for non-ideological reasons; ie, for reasons 
that don’t themselves flow from the authority of the rulers whose 
legitimacy is at stake. As Williams puts it, in a legitimate regime ‘there is a 
legitimation offered which goes beyond the assertion of power’.4 That is a 
bare outline of the abstract component of our account of legitimacy. 
Attention to the EU’s context, then, provides a concrete upshot: we locate 
the legitimacy deficit in the misalignment between the prominent EU 
ruling practices of delegation and pooling, and the historically formed 
legitimation story of popular sovereignty used to make sense of political 
authority within Member States. In other words, Western liberal 
democracies have not yet elaborated a legitimation story that fits an entity 
such as the EU. The conclusion also suggests that a solution to this 
democratic deficit should take normative priority over questions of social 
justice. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. In the first section, we set out the 
basics of our general account of legitimacy. In the second section, we show 
why the standard realist theory of legitimacy requires an account of 
popular sovereignty in modern democratic contexts. In the third section, 
we apply our theory to the EU’s dominant ruling practices. The fourth 
section summarizes the argument and sketches an alternative vista. 
 
1. Williams’ realist theory of legitimacy, critical 
responsiveness, and ‘bare liberalism’ 
Bernard Williams’ theory of legitimacy is both a direct engagement with a 
traditional concern of normative political theory, and an attempt to re-
orient political theory, in two ways: away from the primacy of matters of 
justice, and away from the primacy of ethical considerations as constraints 
or aims for political action. Williams’ begins by identifying a ‘“first” 
political question, namely, ‘the securing of order, protection, safety, trust, 
and the conditions of cooperation.’5 But, unlike in Hobbes, successfully 
answering the first political question is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for a regime’s legitimacy. To achieve legitimacy a polity must 
meet what Williams calls the “Basic Legitimation Demand” (BLD): 
‘Meeting the BLD can be equated with there being an ‘acceptable’ 
solution to the first political question.’6 Crucially, this acceptability is not 
the moralized notion familiar from many mainstream theories of 
                                                
4 Bernard Williams, In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political 
Argument (Princeton University Press, 2005), 11. 
5 Ibid, 3. 
6 Ibid, 4. 
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legitimacy. If it is a moral notion at all, it is ‘a morality internal to politics.’7 
For Williams, “making sense” is ‘a category of historical understanding, 
[…] a hermeneutical category’8 which assesses whether the legitimation 
offered by the rulers can be understood as such by those to whom it is 
addressed. More precisely, however, the idea is about checking whether 
an ‘intelligible order of authority makes sense to us as such a structure’ 
which ‘requires […], that there is a legitimation offered which goes 
beyond the assertion of power’.9 Williams adds that ‘we can recognise such 
a thing because in the light of the historical and cultural circumstances 
[…] it [makes sense] to us as a legitimation.’10 This idea relies on “our” 
ability to differentiate legitimations based on assertions of power from 
legitimations for the endorsement of which there are reasons other than 
their hold of power over us.  
To turn this distinction into a tool of normative evaluation 
Williams introduces his “Critical Theory Principle” (CTP): ‘the 
acceptance of a justification does not count if the acceptance itself is 
produced by the coercive power which is supposedly being justified.’11 For 
Williams, ‘the difficulty with [this principle], of making good on claims of 
false consciousness and the like, lies in deciding what counts as having 
been “produced by” coercive power in the relevant sense’.12 So, in a 
Weberian vein, the source of legitimacy lies in the value-beliefs of the 
stakeholders; ie, those over whom the power is exercised. A regime turns 
out to be illegitimate if the people accept its official justification—its 
legitimation story—only because they have not come to realize yet that 
there are no other reasons than the power of this regime for them to accept 
it as legitimate.13 The test, though, is best understood as hypothetical. We 
look at actual beliefs, add an empirically-informed causal story about their 
origin, and then imagine what the correct response would be once the 
causal story has been revealed to the belief holders. So we start with the 
people’s current beliefs and imagine them going through a process of 
criticism, a process in which the test plays a significant part.14 To clarify 
what ‘counts as having been “produced by” coercive power in the relevant 
sense’.15 Williams relies on what Raymond Geuss calls ‘reflective 
unacceptability’.16 To be sure, the hypothetical test is not opposed to also 
encouraging a process of reflection in actual people on whether they 
would still hold on to their beliefs (directly or indirectly about the 
legitimacy of the regime), once they had realised how they came to hold 
them. At any rate, this process will lead to context-sensitive evaluations 
                                                
7 Ibid, 7. 
8 Ibid, 11. 
9 Ibid, 11. 
10 Ibid, 11. 
11 Ibid, 6. 
12 Ibid, 6. 
13 Bernard Williams, Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy (Princeton 
University Press, 2002) 231.  
14 Ibid, 227; Here we set aside the question of the extent to which Williams’ 
approach is in danger of introducing pre-political moral commitments from the 
back door. On this issue see: Edward Hall, ‘Contingency, Confidence and 
Liberalism in the Political Thought of Bernard Williams’ (2014) 40(4) Social 
Theory and Practice 545-569; Janosch Prinz and Enzo Rossi, ‘Political Realism as 
Ideology Critique’ (forthcoming) Critical Review of International Social and Political 
Philosophy; Paul Sagar, From Scepticism to Liberalism? Bernard Williams, the 
Foundations of Liberalism and Political Realism (2014), Political Studies, online: 
<www.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1467-9248.12173/full>. 
15 Williams (n 4) 5. 
16 Raymond Geuss, The Idea of a Critical Theory (Cambridge University Press, 
1981) 55-69. 
 4 
based on one’s assessment of what reasons are actually available to the 
citizenry. 
Note the crucial difference between this approach and the 
standard, voluntaristic account of democratic legitimacy: our focus is on 
responsiveness to stakeholders’ values, not on the enactment of their will.17 
Our take on Williams’ view combines a central feature of empirical studies 
of the quality of democracy, namely, the attention to value-alignment or 
responsiveness18, with a central feature of critical theory as a form of 
political evaluation, namely, the attention to the ideological character of 
some beliefs in legitimacy. So we term this approach critical responsiveness.  
Critical responsiveness is a universal account of legitimacy in its 
abstract form, but it is underpinned by two forms of contextualism. First, 
on this broadly realist view, politics is a context with its own form of 
normativity, so that pre-political moral demands do not reach into 
politics.19 Here a lot of work is done by the very concept of politics. Raw 
domination of the sort endured by the Helots in Sparta just isn’t politics, 
and this is a conceptual rather than a moral claim.20 So this is a form of 
cross-cultural, conceptual contextualism—perhaps more of a category or 
scope restriction.21 Second, each legitimation will have to culturally and 
historically specific elements, as per the Critical Theory Test described 
above. This is contextualism in the more familiar sense of the term. It is 
best understood as the need to provide a “legitimation story” to each 
citizen.22 Again, it is not clear to what extent we should take this literally. 
But the general idea seems to be that the public culture should contain the 
resourcesto allow the citizenry to make sense of the power exercised over 
them. If these legitimation stories are not widely accepted, rule can 
become perceived as domination resulting in resentment. The latter could 
threaten the political order, and subsequently economic, social, moral 
orders in the polity.23 And if the legitimation stories are accepted for the 
wrong reasons, through ideological distortion, then their normative force 
is eroded. 
When applied to our current predicament, these two elements 
yield Williams’ abstract formula: ‘LEG + Modernity = Liberalism’.24 
“LEG” signifies a satisfactory answer to the first political questions; ie, the 
meeting of the Basic Legitimation Demand. “Modernity” is an umbrella 
term for the culturally specific legitimation. The rough idea is that, given 
the expectations about security and protection of individual rights 
developed in Western societies, no set of political arrangements other than 
a liberal one would meet the BLD.  
One may ask whether Williams isn’t allowing liberalism to pass 
the Critical Theory Test too easily here, given the actual history of liberal 
states and of belief in the political centrality of individual rights, and 
                                                
17 Tamsin Shaw, ‘Max Weber on Democracy: Can the People Have Political 
Power in Modern States?’ (2008) 15(1) Constellations 33–45. 
18 Andrew Sabl, ‘The Two Cultures of Democratic Theory’ (2015) 13(2) 
Perspectives on Politics 345-365; note that responsiveness can apply to other 
analytical levels of legitimacy-evaluation, such as input or output. 
19 Robert Jubb and Enzo Rossi, ‘Political Norms and Moral Values’ (2015) 40 
Journal of Philosophical Research 455-458. 
20 Williams (n 4) 5. 
21 One may well contest the coherence of such a move, for instance, noting that 
the concept of politics is essentially contestable. 
22 Williams (n 4) 5 .  
23 Andrea Sangiovanni, 'Justice and the Priority of Politics to Morality' (2008) 
16(2) Journal of Political Philosophy 137-164, 156-157. 
24 Williams (n 4), 9. 
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especially the property rights that are characteristic of liberalism.25 
Williams’ answer to that challenge would draw on what, following Judith 
Shklar, he calls ‘the liberalism of fear’.26 This view, sometimes also 
referred to as “bare liberalism”, is a largely negative defence of some tenets 
of liberalism, especially individual rights. The rough idea is that, 
historically, liberalism has proved more effective than other systems at 
preventing the sorts of evils that most people would associate with overly 
powerful government—cruelty, torture, and, more generally, ‘being in 
someone else’s power’27; the same sort of political normativity behind the 
Critical Theory Test. 
For our present purposes, it will be important to draw attention to 
the fit of this sort of minimal liberalism within Williams’ equation. On the 
left side of the equation we have a rather rich story, or at least we should. 
‘Modernity’ is a wide umbrella term.28 While it seems clear that the bare 
liberalism on the right side of the equation can provide an answer to the 
first political question in our context, it also seems rather thin, if we are to 
think of it as the product of “LEG” and “Modernity”. Is a government that 
can spare us from cruelty all that we have come to expect in Europe’s 
modern context? We are not suggesting that (bare) liberalism is not part of 
the answer, but simply that it is not the entirety of the answer. To the 
extent that European political theory and political culture has developed 
and consolidated something approaching a consensus in the way to answer 
those questions, that consensus makes room for the ideal of popular 
sovereignty. In other words, the liberalism on the right side of the 
equation is either an inadequately narrow answer result, or it should be 
understood as part of de facto union between liberalism and democracy 
(even if it is just a marriage of convenience) that characterizes successful 
legitimation stories in our part of the world.  
 
2. Popular sovereignty in modern democracies  
Up to this point, our argument has remained rather abstract. We will now 
delve into the legitimation story based on popular sovereignty in the 
context of the democratic nation-state and then the possibilities for the 
same story to legitimise in the contemporary political landscape after 
European integration. Williams’ normative preference for “bare 
liberalism” relies on a particular historical narrative. An alternative history 
can be told, especially for modern democracies, in which popular sovereignty 
features centrally in the legitimation story accepted by democratic citizens.  
The logic of popular sovereignty29 is that the people are the source 
of all political authority in the polity; therefore, the right to rule derives 
from the subjects as part of a collective. Many analyses of popular 
sovereignty have been offered in academia. For our purposes, Jonathan 
White offers a useful account of this logic, which captures many possible 
conceptions. He argues that a ‘bond of collectivity’ creates a people out of 
a diverse multitude, which subsequently sets the standards of legitimate 
                                                
25 For this line of argument see: Carlo Argenton and Enzo Rossi, ‘Libertarianism, 
Capitalism, Ideology: A Reality Check’ (2016) Working paper. 
26 Williams (n 4) 52-61. 
27 Ibid 61. 
28 Enzo Rossi, ‘Consensus, compromise, justice and legitimacy’ (2013) 16(4) 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 557–572. 
29 Democratic and legal scholars also use ‘constituent power’ for this logic, eg: 
Andreas Kalyvas, 'Popular Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power' 
(2005) 12(2) Constellations 223-244; Martin Loughlin, 'The concept of constituent 
power' (2014) 13(2) European Journal of Political Theory 218-237; Markus Patberg, 
'Constituent Power beyond the State: An Emerging Debate in International 
Political Theory' (2013) 42(1) Millennium: Journal of International Studies 224-238. 
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(democratic) rule.30 White’s concept is intended to be applicable to, and 
facilitate interplay between, both theory and practice. In theories of 
popular sovereignty, a philosopher delineates a shared bond to then work 
out principles of legitimacy. In practice, popular sovereignty can only 
legitimise if citizens sincerely believe in the existence of a collective bond 
of some sort. This duality will also serve our analysis well, because, in this 
section, we will move from philosophical analysis to a historical one to 
assess popular sovereignty’s realist credentials.  
Before turning to historical-contextual aspects, we will first 
analyse whether popular sovereignty is an attractive value for political 
realists of a critical bend. In the context of modern pluralistic democracies, 
two reasons make popular sovereignty into a particularly attractive value. 
First, popular sovereignty can accommodate disagreement. It can provide 
justifications of rule even in polities with little homogeneity, thus taking 
into account the diversity of its stakeholders: rulers and the citizens. A 
particularly “thin” bond of collectivity justifies rule for certain Pareto 
optimal outcomes.31 Williams’ preferred ideal of bare liberalism fits with 
such a conception of popular sovereignty. The only bond between the 
multitude is their interest in safeguarding their basic rights. However, 
citizens might share more common ground than a commitment to some 
basic rights, which might justify the enforcement of more extensive 
collective projects. A ‘thick’—typically cultural—bond or a consensus on 
democratic values are the main alternatives in the literature.32 On a 
sociological level, a too thin conception of the bond of collectivity is 
troublesome for democracies. Therefore, some kind of thick or political 
bond might be necessary in practice. On a philosophical level, however, 
such a bond can mediate disagreements between rulers and citizens 
following the legitimation logic of popular sovereignty. 
The second reason is that popular sovereignty can legitimise 
coercion but also provides a normative basis to defend citizens from 
ideological distortions.33  The bond of collectivity can legitimise collective 
coercive structures. A problematic feature, however, is the possibility of 
disenfranchisement. As history shows, in liberal-democratic contexts, a 
shift towards the protection of negative rights (bare liberalism) is often 
accompanied by a loss of the mass-participatory aspect of democracy.34 
Popular sovereignty, on the other hand, prescribes that rulers should 
remain responsive to the values of the subjects, which can include but is 
not limited to the protection of their rights. Moreover, popular sovereignty 
empowers citizens to judge whether a regime is actually acting in 
alignment with their commitments, which in turn requires critical scrutiny 
of ideological structures. In the end, the citizens are the sole fountain of 
legitimacy in the polity; not the rulers. In sum, popular sovereignty is an 
attractive political value from the point of view of a critical political realist. 
This realist analysis establishes philosophical attractiveness of popular 
sovereignty’s BLD; this is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a 
political value.  
A political value should make sense to the citizens that it pertains to 
govern in a historical context. Historically, the rise of popular sovereignty is 
often connected to modernity’s disenchantment. Where European 
medieval states relied upon Christianity to ground political authority, 
                                                
30 Jonathan White, Political Allegiance after European Integration (Palgrave 
Macmillan UK, 2011) 5-6. 
31 Ibid. 6-7. 
32 Ibid. 
33 On ideological distortion, see: Prinz and Rossi (n 14). 
34 Peter Mair, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy (Verso, 2013); 
Colin Crouch, Post-Democracy (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd , 2004). 
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bereft of such metaphysical principles, modern democracies require a 
popular sovereign.35 The change from the divine right of kings to popular 
sovereignty constituted a transformation from a vertical to a horizontal 
principle of legitimacy; normative authority in the polity transferred from 
the ruler(s) to the ruled36—‘marks a break with an old world’.37 Rulers of 
the two modern regimes par excellence—democracies and totalitarian 
regimes—claim to exercise power within their polity in the name of ‘the 
people’.38 They appeal to the principle of popular sovereignty. Certainly, in 
democracies, this principle has no rival when legitimating the use of force. 
Moreover, in international politics, it is not just leaders, but citizenries that 
acted as vehicles for maintaining national sovereignty.39 On this reading, 
popular sovereignty became the legitimation story within modernity’s 
disenchanted cosmology, which also makes sense to the citizens in this 
historical context. 
Up to this point, we have argued that popular sovereignty is a 
realist alternative to Bernard Williams’ normative theory of bare 
liberalism. We will now continue with an assessment of whether or not 
this legitimation story passes Williams’ critical theory principle. If the 
belief in popular sovereignty is merely a product of past coercion by the 
state, then this legitimation story is not acceptable for a realist. We will, 
however, suggest that coercion played a role but its widespread 
acceptance cannot be entirely attributed to state coercion.  
 No realist denies that force plays a central role in politics, however 
belief in the legitimacy of the coercive structures should not be secured 
through those same structures. The critical theory test aims to assess 
whether ideological distortion in the past has taken place. The following 
genealogy is not extensive, but serves to illustrate popular sovereignty as 
legitimation value was not imposed by rulers upon the public.  
Paradoxically, popular sovereignty finds its modern roots not in 
democratic but in monarchical thought. The monarchs use it against 
opponents in parliament. The latter, however, successfully appropriated 
popular sovereignty to legitimate themselves as representatives of the 
people.40 Ultimately, the value would fuel democratic revolutions in 
Western democracies, hence rulers and rebels played an essential role in 
placing popular sovereignty at the heart of the (de)legitimation story of 
the modern state.  
 Moving from the value to its institutionalisation, state- and nation-
building processes have been violent affairs, resulting in the institutional 
preconditions of popular sovereignty: sovereign states and peoplehood. A 
vast literature exists that illustrates the importance of war in the 
                                                
35 Christopher J Bickerton, 'Europe's Neo-Madisonians: Rethinking the 
Legitimacy of Limited Power in a Multi-level Polity' (2011) 59(3) Political Studies 
659-673, 666-668. 
36 Cécile Laborde, 'Republican Citizenship and the Crisis of Integration in France' 
in Richard Bellamy, Dario Castiglione and Emilio Santoro (eds), Lineages of 
European Citizenship Rights, Belonging and Participation in Eleven Nation-States 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 52. 
37 Pierre Rosanvallon, 'The Metamorphoses of Democratic Legitimacy: 
Impartiality, Reflexivity, Proximity' (2011) 18(2) Constellations 114-123, 120. 
38 Claude Lefort, 'The logic of totalitarianism' in John B. Thompson (ed), The 
Political Forms of Modern Society: Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism (Polity 
Press, 1986) 288. 
39 Raymond Aron, 'The Anarchical Order of Power' (1995) 124(3) Daeldalus 27-
52. 
40 Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People. The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England 
and America (W W Norton & Company, 1988). 
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establishment of the centralized state.41 Broadly, war required funds due 
to technological advances, such as fortresses and gunpowder. The 
recruitment of standing armies created further costs. These military 
developments were an important factor in the creation of centralized state 
institutions, such as tax collecting agencies. National economies became 
centrally managed by the state to ensure competitive advantages. In 
Europe, centralized states with the ability to enforce decisions in their 
territory—infrastructural power—became a fact. Moreover, since the 
Peace of Westphalia, these centralized states were attributed the status of 
sovereignty.42 
The centralized institutions played an important role in the 
creation of peoplehood. These processes were both intentional and 
unintentional. Among the former, in Europe, homogenisation is a product 
of linguistic and ethnic cleansing.43 Yet, even these processes were not 
necessarily always aimed at self-legitimation; other concerns such as 
economic competitiveness also played a role.44 In a similar vein, the 
military and administrative state apparatus resulted in unintentional 
homogenisation. One of the most important reasons was the creation of a 
hard boundary between states, where rule within treated (most) citizens 
the same. To legitimate state rule, stories were told about the boundaries, 
which lay the foundation of sincerely held beliefs about subjects’ ties45: 
their bonds of collectivity. As Sofia Nässtrom sums up these processes, 
‘peoplehood always is born out of a combination of coercive force and 
persuasive storytelling’.46 
These violent processes acted as a catalyst for popular demands 
including democratization of decision-making: democratic popular 
sovereignty. Popular pressures played an essential role in the introduction, 
subsequent extensions and continuously sustaining democratic procedures 
in domestic politics.47 The sacrifices asked from citizens by the state, such 
as making war and paying taxes, were important reasons to demand more 
extensive welfare provisions from the state. In a more institutional vein, 
citizens started to demand a voice in politics, which became more 
important as citizens could not simply ‘exit’ from the state.48 In this 
                                                
41 See, for instance: Charles Tilly, 'Reflections on the History of European State-
Making', The Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton University 
Press, 1975) 3-83; Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles. War, Peace, and the Course of 
History (Allen Lane, 2002); Michael Mann, 'The Autonomous Power of the State: 
Its Origins, Mechanism and Results', Archives Européennes de Sociologie Paris (1984) 
25(2) 185-213 [Republished 109-36]. 
42 Roland Axtmann, 'The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and 
its Contemporary Transformation' (2004) 25(3) International Political Science Review 
259-279; Stefano Bartolini, Restructuring Europe. Centre Formation, System Building, 
and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union (Oxford 
University Press, 2005), 64. 
43 Michael Mann, 'Genocidal Democracies in the New World', The Dark Side of 
Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2005) 70-110. 
44 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Cornell University Press, 1983). 
45 Charles Tilly, 'Ties That Bind ... And Bound', Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties 
(Paradigm Publishers, 2005), 3-12. 
46 Sofia Näsström, 'The Legitimacy of the People' (2007) 35(5) Political Theory 
624-58, 629. 
47 Jürgen Habermas, 'The Bourgeois Public Sphere: Idea and Ideology', The 
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society (Polity Press, 1992), 89-140, 131-132. 
48 Stein Rokkan, State Formation, Nation-Building, and Mass Politics in Europe. The 
Theory of Stein Rokkan: Based on His Collected Works (Oxford University Press, 
1999). 
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context, nationality became enriched with democratic citizenship49, which 
increasingly replaced purely ethnic-linguistic markers.50 The 
democratization of the state and peoplehood thus is in part a result of 
popular pressures to meet citizens’ legitimation demands. 
From a realist perspective, political power’s constitutive role in 
creating unity is not a surprise.51 The pertinent question is whether 
coercive structures are the sole or predominant reason for these 
legitimating beliefs. Our admittedly broad stroke account of state- and 
nation-building shows that the story is one of enforcement and rebellion, 
and raison d’état and popular demands. The legitimation value of popular 
sovereignty and its institutionalization in modern state-democracies are, at 
least in part, the result of popular pressure rather than elite domination, 
hence popular sovereignty passes the critical theory test.  
At this point, we turn to the assessment of popular sovereignty in 
ruling practices. To assess rulers (critical) responsiveness, we analyse 
whether the coercive structures of the modern democratic state conform to 
the value of popular sovereignty. This assessment is important for the 
subsequent analysis of Europe’s democratic deficit. Because of this 
consideration, we focus solely on the democratic conception of popular 
sovereignty as empowerment in decision-making. One initial observation, 
which is essential for this realist analysis, is that modern states’ capacity to 
implement its decisions is an often overlooked but essential feature of 
modern democracies.52 The crucial point is not merely that these coercive 
structures can maintain order, but that infrastructural power is essential to 
meet democratic basic legitimation demand. A democracy that cannot 
implement collective decisions doesn’t institutionalize the sovereignty of the 
people, hence it is incongruent with the value of popular sovereignty. 
Domestically, modern democracies share two central features to 
make rule subject to citizens’ power: vote and voice. Voice refers to the 
deliberative dimension of mass democracies. Democracies have forums in 
which rulers and ruled can publically exchange ideas among each other 
and themselves. More instrumentally, they enable citizens to keep track of 
their rulers, while rulers can keep track of the citizens’ preferences. These 
public forums are not merely passive registers of preferences; debate can 
also change opinions and mobilize the citizenry. 
The vote further empowers citizens to actively hold their rulers to 
account. The people are empowered to elect representatives to make 
decisions reflecting their position. By the same means, citizens are given 
the power to eject unresponsive rulers. Modern democracies thus offer 
“the people” instrumental, albeit indirect, powers to remain sovereign 
decision-makers in the polity. Vote and voice institutionalize democratic 
procedures that—however imperfect—conform to the logic of popular 
sovereignty. It is that sense that rulers’ legitimation stories of popular 
sovereignty can also pass the (critical) responsiveness test. 
Popular sovereignty also authorizes democratic rulers in the 
international realm. The veto is a particularly important institution in this 
regard. State sovereignty, and by extension, popular sovereignty, is closely 
                                                
49 TH Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class (Cambridge University Press, 1950) 1-
85. 
50 Jürgen Habermas, 'National Unification and Popular Sovereignty', (1996) no 
219 New Left Review 3-13. 
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52 Clauss Offe and Ulrich K Preuss, 'The Problem of Legitimacy in the European 
polity: is democratization the answer?' in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck 
(eds), The Diversity of Democracy: Corporatism, Social Order and Political Conflict 
(Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2006) 175-204. 
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associated with freedom from external interference. Rulers often argue 
that they represent the citizens’ collective interests abroad, such as peace 
or greater overall prosperity. Democratic rulers can justify their authority 
abroad as elected representatives by their sovereign people. However, this 
claim requires institutionalization. Leaving aside the restraints on de facto 
sovereignty53, rulers are, in principle, autonomous in their decision-
making. When entering into agreements, international organizations 
recognize this claim by attributing veto powers to all state 
representatives.54 Veto power institutionalizes the people’s sovereignty in 
ruling practices in the international realm. So the practices of coercive rule 
in democratic state polities conform to the legitimation story of popular 
sovereignty, both internally and internationally. 
As we have seen, from a realist perspective, popular sovereignty is 
a normatively attractive political value even upon critical scrutiny. 
However, can this political value also act as the core of a democratic 
legitimation story for the EU?   
 
3. Does EU Rule Conform to the Realist Value of Popular 
Sovereignty?  
European political integration constitutes a transformation of the EU-
polity into a new kind of democracy.55 Since the 1990s, EU-rule has 
become more institutionalized, and greater emphasis has been given to the 
Union’s direct relationship with its subjects, such as EU-citizenship. The 
Union, therefore, has moved beyond the status of a “normal” international 
organization. Leaving aside the details of Europe’s institutional 
complexities56, Wallace’s famous analysis of the European Community as 
‘Less than a Federation, More than a Regime’57 is even more true for the 
current Union. These same developments have been a catalyst for the so-
called democratic deficit.58 This deficit has an empirical dimension in 
widespread concerns about the EU’s social legitimacy, and the “objective” 
democratic credentials of its institutions. However, we will assess the EU-
rule’s legitimacy on a philosophical level. 
In order to do so, we require an account of the institutionalisation 
of rule. The two prevalent institutionalized forms of EU-rule are: (1) 
delegation of state powers to administrative agents, and (2) pooling of state 
powers in decision-making procedures without retaining veto-power. We 
do not claim that these forms solve any interpretative issue on the 
character of the EU’s governance-regime.59  The more modest claim is that 
                                                
53 Admittedly, modern states’ autonomy is always limited in certain ways. 
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59 Andrew Moravcsik, 'In Defence of the 'Democratic Deficit': Reassessing 
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these practices contribute to the in-between status of the current Union. 
Francis Cheneval’s ideal-type of multilateralism builds on these forms. A 
multilateral polity has ‘functionally differentiated constitution of 
incongruent territorial hierarchies through institutionalized co-operation 
and integration between states. The multilateral process blends domestic 
and intergovernmental structures through their linkage to supranational 
modes of decision-making, dispute settlement, and jurisdiction.’60 This 
ideal-type captures key features of the EU-regime with its mix of 
supranational institutions, such as the European Parliament and the 
European Central Bank, and intergovernmental institutions, such as the 
Council system. A multilateral regime consists of ‘limited, differentiated 
delegation of competences to supranational agents and of 
intergovernmentalism in the areas where states cooperate but retain full or 
shared decision-making power.’61  
Before turning to the question of responsiveness, let us briefly 
elaborate the relevance of popular sovereignty as a political value in the 
EU-context. The democratic conception of popular sovereignty remains 
relevant because evidence exists that EU-citizens remain committed to the 
value of popular sovereignty in relation to democratic regime legitimacy.62 
Further, much has changed in contemporary politics–late modernity if you 
will–compared to early modernity. One consistent factor is that politics in 
the West takes place in what one may call a disenchanted cosmology.63 
Popular sovereignty remains a suitable source of authority in the EU-
polity, which also makes sense to its citizens. Therefore, we will assess 
whether institutionalised practices of rule broadly conform to the political 
value of popular sovereignty. 
 Turning first to delegation, this practice is not necessarily 
incompatible with popular sovereignty. Domestically, administrative 
agencies are often placed at arm’s length from politicians. In a similar vein, 
democratic politics cannot easily or at all intervene with constitutional 
courts. The legitimation story is that the autonomy of these institutions 
serves the interests of the people—popular sovereignty as output 
legitimacy, in other words. Still, democratic politics can often intervene 
with these administrative agencies through some, at times complex, 
procedure. German governments have at times challenged the famously 
independent German Central Bank, the Bundesbank.64 Therefore, 
accountability remains possible by the democratic order. Delegation thus 
does not constitute a problem at first glance. 
 Moreover, transnational delegation is a rational route to pursue 
for governments on the classic intergovernmental logic of credible 
commitments. Intergovernmentalism assumes that governments are 
primarily motivated by self-interest. They enter into international 
agreements to pursue their self-interest and, in the case of democracies,  
                                                                                                              
'The European Union: Democratic Legitimacy in a Regional State?' (2004) 42(5) 
Journal of Common Market Studies 975-997; Jan Zielonka, Europe as Empire: The 
Nature of the Enlarged European Union (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
60 Francis Cheneval, ‘The Hobbesian Case for Multilateralism’ (2007)13(3) Swiss 
Political Science Review 309-335, 328. 
61 Ibid, 329; italics added for emphasis. 
62 Juan Díez Medrano, 'Europe's Political Identity: Public Sphere and Public 
Opinion' in Justine Lacroix and Kalypso Nicolaïdis (eds), European Stories: 
Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts (Oxford University Press, 2010). 
63 See, for instance: Christopher J Bickerton, 'Europe's Neo-Madisonians: 
Rethinking the Legitimacy of Limited Power in a Multi-Level Polity' (2011) 
59(3) Political Studies 659-73. 
64 Richard Bellamy and Albert Weale, 'Political legitimacy and European 
monetary union: contracts, constitutionalism and the normative logic of two-level 
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the interests of their people. European integration is often motivated by 
efficiency concerns.65 However, self-interest can also motivate non-
compliance. To avoid governments not holding up their end of the deal, 
EU Member States have delegated quite a few powers to supranational 
administrative agencies. These institutions are granted autonomy to ensure 
no single government can influence them. This kind of delegation is a tool 
for intergovernmental actors to ensure compliance.  
That being said, this type of delegation is of a qualitatively 
different nature than its domestic counterpart. The core reason is the 
creation of a new power without a clear chain of delegation. Hans Agné 
persuasively makes this case66 and we shall outline the relevant parts of his 
argument for our analysis. Unlike a national act of delegation, when 
governments choose to delegate power to a supranational agency, they 
create a new power. The agency has capabilities to enforce a policy that no 
one government had the authority to take before its existence. Moreover, 
Agné argues that ‘the authority conferred on international agencies can 
[no longer] be retrieved by democratic states, or effectively influenced 
through democratic procedures.’67 Agné provocatively implies that EU-
citizens might have been alienated from their powers rather than 
delegating them. At this point, the incompatibility with popular 
sovereignty comes clearly into focus. The democratic challenge with 
transnational delegation is that the institution’s power is no longer directly 
traceable to a sovereign people.68  
 So far we have used a simple analytic distinction between pooling 
of sovereign powers and delegation. Delegation requires the creation of a 
new supranational agency, while pooling sovereignty refers solely to 
European decision-making procedures. In practice, pooling and delegation 
touch upon another. One might well argue that delegation is a particular 
form of pooling sovereignty. However, pooling sovereignty does not 
necessitate a new European actor. EU-rulers can make legally binding 
decisions, but leave implementation solely to its Member States’ 
bureaucracies.  
Pooling sovereignty is also not necessarily incompatible with the 
value of popular sovereignty. Traditionally, nation-states pool powers in 
international organizations. These organizations have an essential 
institutional feature: the veto. Notwithstanding that de facto, sovereignty is 
often compromised in international relations–arguably only the hegemon 
is truly sovereign–de jure sovereignty should be recognized in this 
institutional feature. It should be, because the legitimation story of popular 
sovereignty relies on its presence. Therefore, again, we need not 
necessarily dismiss this ruling practice out of hand as incompatible with 
popular sovereignty.  
The above picture, however, does not fully capture the practice of 
pooling sovereignty in the EU. As Francis Cheneval puts it, governments 
retain full or shared sovereignty in decision-making procedures. The 
                                                
65 Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from 
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distinction between full and shared sovereignty is key to our analysis. 
When states retain full sovereignty, they continue to have the option to 
enact veto power. In the EU, Member States retain full sovereignty in 
many matters. One crucial area, for instance, is treaty ratification. The 
European Commission might be the Guardian of the Treaties; the Member 
States remain its Masters. In these intergovernmental negotiations, the 
Member States hold veto power simply by refusing to sign. One 
consequence has been that Member States have been able to negotiate 
opt-outs resulting in differentiated integration.69 The pooling of 
sovereignty that results in legally binding treaties is unproblematic. The 
intergovernmental representatives can claim to represent their sovereign 
people; otherwise, they would not have signed the treaty or, in different 
contexts, vetoed the legislation. 
Shared sovereignty in decision-making, however, is a different 
matter. We define shared sovereignty as intergovernmental decision-
making without veto-power. This form of EU-rule poses an institutional 
challenge to the sovereign status of governments in international relations. 
In many policy areas, the Member States have given up on the 
institutional feature of popular sovereignty: the veto. One of the most 
important features is that qualified majority voting has become the most 
widely used decision-making procedure in the Councils. In practice, a 
consensual style of decision-making characterizes these procedures. 
However, style is not a check on real power. By giving up on the 
institutional veto, Member States can no longer guarantee the sovereignty 
of their people. In effect, they have placed a “gifted resource”–the status of 
sovereignty–beyond their control. This practice sits badly with the 
democratic legitimation story of popular sovereignty. 
In a different vein, observers might argue the European 
Parliament (EP) and national parliaments have been given the means to 
influence decision-making. However, in as far as this is true, it is only 
partially the case. Decision-making procedures often include 
supranational and national parliamentary bodies. The EP can play a 
connecting role between national parliaments within a ‘field or 
parliaments’ scrutinizing EU-rule.70 More importantly, the ordinary 
legislative procedure (OLP) and the yellow, orange, and, possibly in the 
future, green card procedures, ensure involvement of parliamentary 
bodies. The vote has been institutionalised in the EU-regime, hence 
popular sovereignty has been (partly) institutionalised within Europe’s 
decision-making procedures. 
However, two reasons can be given to seriously doubt this 
analysis. The first is conceptual: the lack of a clear sovereign people. The 
second is practical: the lack of the preconditions of voice. A conceptual 
concern is that OLP and card procedures effectively empower a different 
“demos”. The former empowers a European demos, while the latter 
empowers national demoi. In democratic theory, demoicratic and mixte 
constituent positions provide conceptual solutions in which multiple demoi 
legitimise an overarching kratos.71 A discussion between these positions is 
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whether the EP should or does represent an overarching demos or 
remains an institution for national interest representation.  
The second reason returns us to the practical analysis. 
Domestically, voice played a complementary role to the vote, however the 
European reality is that voice remains nationally organized. On an 
optimistic interpretation, Europe has a nascent transnational public sphere 
in which some public debate takes place. However, even European topics 
are mostly discussed in national public spheres.72 Therefore, national 
considerations and assumptions continue to shape these debates. 
European decision-makers cannot keep track of popular sovereign will, or 
of the relevant cleavages within society. Moreover, European publics face 
serious coordination issues in keeping track of their decision-makers. 
European decision-makers, such as Commissioners or MEPs, cannot 
therefore rely on the value of popular sovereignty to legitimate their rule. 
These democratic observations relate closely to the broader observation 
about the lack of a European demos. 
Finally, we should address recent developments in the EU 
pertaining to the institutional response (or lack thereof) to the crises. This 
development fits a general tendency towards the emergence of an 
executive-administrative order73, which undermines any appeal to the 
value of popular sovereignty. In response to the Euro-crisis, Member 
State governments started to make decisions outside the European 
framework. In essence, governments strengthened their position in 
European decision-making.74 The EP and national parliaments were 
relegated to consultative bodies rather than proper legislators.75 Thus, the 
vote has become de-institutionalised at the European level. In line with 
past developments, intergovernmental agents allowed effective decision-
making to trump democratization of the Union.76 A transnational 
legitimation story of popular sovereignty is further compromised rather 
than further institutionalized, hence it fails this realist test.  
Moreover, these recent developments challenge the 
intergovernmental legitimation story of an EU that represents sovereign 
peoples. The classic intergovernmental argument is that government 
representatives choose to remain in Europe.77 This asserted autonomy is 
doubtful, however. At present, it would appear that the costs of exit have 
become extremely high, if not prohibitively so.78 Member State 
governments ‘choose’ to accept direct intervention into the sovereign 
domain instead of unilateral withdraw. In Italy, under European pressure, 
the technocratic Monti government replaced Berlusconi’s democratically 
elected one. Despite a negative referendum outcome, the Greek 
government has been effectively forced to accept stringent austerity 
measures with their bailout packages. The British membership 
referendum shows that seriously considering exit is not impossible. Note 
that a majority of the citizens took the decision to leave, while most of the 
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British political elite campaigned to remain in the EU. In a different vein, 
as Ben Crum observes, ‘[Monetary integration can] be expected to lead to 
states being bound to ever more detailed policy contracts that hollow out 
their political autonomy in financial and economic matters.’79 The recent 
developments resulted in a tendency toward intergovernmental agents 
losing their de facto veto. These forms of EU-rule do not conform to the 
value of popular sovereignty.  
Having established that EU-rule, especially in the light of recent 
developments, does not sit well with the realist value of popular 
sovereignty, a final note on Europe’s historical trajectory. We want to 
show that the processes were not necessarily unresponsive to citizens’ 
value commitments, hence, for a realist, the Union’s history can pass the 
test of critical responsiveness. The European project’s origins lie in the 
devastation of the Second World War. The European integration project 
was the means of European rulers to regain legitimacy from the people.80 
A disquieting story can be told about European integration in which 
concerns about political and increasingly economic security drive further 
integration. This narrative of emergency measures results in a 
disenfranchisement of Europe’s democratic citizenries.81 Moreover, this 
disenfranchisement was, in part, by design in order to protect liberal 
democracy with an eye to the atrocities of populist nationalism.82 These 
choices do not necessary fail the test of critical responsiveness. In the 
aftermath of the Second World War, citizens wanted peace, democracy, 
and prosperity. Moreover, political disagreements were funnelled through 
intergovernmental channels. The EU has been the product of 
intergovernmental treaties.83 Governmental agents continue to play a 
authoritative role within the EU’s infrastructural framework.84 The 
institutional outcome-transnational delegation and shared sovereignty in 
decision-making procedures-however, sits badly with the 
intergovernmental legitimation story of popular sovereignty.  
 
4. Conclusion: Popular Sovereignty, Legitimacy and Justice 
In sum, contemporary EU-rule does not pass the test of critical 
responsiveness. The reason is not that popular sovereignty is the product 
of manipulation or that current ruling practices are purely the result of 
unresponsive rulers. On the contrary, citizens at crucial junctions pushed 
the democratic understanding of popular sovereignty, while the European 
integration project reflects popular demands in the aftermath of Second 
World War. The democratic deficit finds its origins in the conflict between 
contemporary ruling practices and the value of popular sovereignty. 
Legitimation stories of popular sovereignty—in both their 
intergovernmental and supranational variations—cannot meet EU 
citizens’ (implicit) basic legitimation demand. It is on this part of the 
analysis of critical responsiveness that EU-rule fails. The empirical 
phenomenon of a trust or legitimacy deficit reflects this realist analysis.  
Yet legitimation stories are not set in stone, hence the EU is 
certainly not doomed to this illegitimate state of affairs. We want to briefly 
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elaborate a possible direction to overcome the democratic deficit. Let us 
return to Bernard Williams’ theory of legitimacy: “LEG = BLD + socio-
political context”. We have argued that citizens’ BLD reflects a continued 
commitment to popular sovereignty. Moreover, this value is attractive 
from a realistic perspective, because, at a conceptual level, it incorporates 
disagreement while also offering a legitimation of coercion based on the 
posited bond of collectivity. The lack of crosscutting cleavages or a shared 
common vernacular undermines a full-blown European democracy.85 This 
observation does not undermine the value of popular sovereignty, but 
rather illustrates the importance of the socio-political context for its 
institutionalization. What kind of legitimation story for the EU might pass 
the realist test of critical responsiveness? 
The historical circumstances coming about through economic and 
technological globalization might become a catalyst for a further change in 
our understanding of legitimacy.86 Traditionally, a commitment to popular 
sovereignty tends toward two possible solutions for the EU’s democratic 
deficit. The so-called communitarians argue that full sovereignty should be 
retained at the national level.87 By contrast, some argue that a European 
superstate is the only legitimate solution.88 In these accounts, popular 
sovereignty remains wedded to state sovereignty. The changes in historical 
circumstances might not constitute a break with our disenchanted, 
democratic beliefs. However, in our age, meaningful self-determination 
relies on interstate cooperation. From this perspective, European 
integration may be turned into a project to maintain popular sovereignty at the 
expense of a degree of state sovereignty.  
 In the current normative debates on the EU’s democratic deficit, 
the ideal of the EU as a demoicracy is in line with this position. From a 
realist perspective, a demoicratic legitimation story of popular sovereignty 
holds some promise. Too little space is available to go into detail; please 
allow us to sketch the bare bones of this reconceptualization.  A shared 
assumption of the demoicrats is that Europe remains a polity of peoples. 
For realists, this assumption is acceptable as part of the socio-political 
circumstances in which the subjects of EU-rule find themselves. The 
second assumption is that this reality does not necessarily disqualify the 
European kratos as illegitimate. European peoples can govern together 
rather than as one, which solves the need for a European demos. This 
demoicratic literature offers multiple justifications for this kratos, while it 
diverges on how to legitimate the Union.89 The essential point is that 
democratic rule is possible despite persisting demoi.  
Taking inspiration from this literature, we propose that, in an age 
of globalization, national popular sovereignty is only attainable through 
cooperation between Europe’s peoples, but arguably at a level that may 
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not permit the immediate implementation of the justice-driven visions of 
some prominent European philosophers such as Philippe Van Parijs and 
Rainer Forst: the supranational and transnational legal and administrative 
institutions envisaged by their redistributive projects seem likely to 
exacerbate Euroskepticism, as a post-functionalist analysis suggests.90 
Without a more convincing legitimation story, the stability of European 
integration remains endangered. The point is not that the aforementioned 
philosophers do not propose desirable political institutions and policies. If 
citizens widely accepted or acquiesced to EU-rule then these projects 
would have a chance. Solidarity might well become a spin-off of political 
institutions. The reality, alas, is different. The Union has for a significant 
number of its citizens become a source of resentment, and building 
solidarity upon resentment is an elusive prospect. The realist view asks us 
to prioritise legitimacy over justice91, hence the pre-eminence of popular 
sovereignty. 
Demoicratic popular sovereignty continues to demand popular 
empowerment at the European level. Delegation and pooling constitute a 
necessary reordering of power in new historical circumstances; however 
this reordering should be accompanied by a reordering of democracy. 
Most importantly, national parliaments should remain ever present in 
decision-making procedures in order to effectively institutionalize vote and 
voice in Europe’s heterogeneous polity. Ideally, these democratic bodies 
funnel existing disagreements at the national level, while at the European 
level, they can engage in cross-national funnelling of disagreements on the 
direction of the Union. A European demoicracy could pass the realist test 
of critical responsiveness: “popular sovereignty + contemporary Europe = 
a European demoicracy”. In practice, this legitimate political order should 
provide a stable foundation on which to build solutions to Europe’s 
challenges.92 
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